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DEREGULATING THE BUS INDUSTRY 
b Y 
K.M. GWILLIAM, C.A. NASH and P.J. MACKIE 
.-. . 
This  work  w a s  s p o n s o r e d  b y  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  L e e d s  
ABSTRACT 
In its Buses White Paper, the British Government sets out its 
proposals for abandoning quantitative control of entry to and 
provision of local bus services. The logic on which the 
proposals are based can be reduced to four propositions:- 
(i) ~ere~ulation will produce a competitive market. 
(ii) Competition will substantially reduce costs. 
(iii) A competitive market will improve resource allocation. 
(iv) A competitive market will not cause any significant 
undesirable spin-off effects. 
Each of these propositions is suspect. 
If there is any competition on bus routes, it will tend to be 
small group rather than large group. Active rivalry involving 
schedule matching and price wars may occur, as may collusion. 
Neither will produce efficient results. 
Even if a competitive result were to obtain, the resulting 
resource allocation would not be socially efficient. A first 
best optimum requires subsidies because the market is subject to 
external economies (the Mohring effect). If Government budget 
constraints operate, the second-best solution then requires 
cross-subsidies. Competition is not compatible with social 
efficiency in either of these cases. Nor will the competitive 
market solution optimise load factors. Quality competition, in 
the form of minibuses 'creaming' the best traffics, may also be 
socially undesirable. 
The White Paper authors underplay the significance of these 
resource allocation arguments, while exaggerating the likely 
impact of deregulation on cost efficiency. Even though some cost 
savings may be available they could be obtained anyway under a 
regime of competitive tendering for profitable as well as 
unprofitable routes. Competition for the market rather than 
competition in the market is required. 
DEREGULATING THE BUS INDUSTRY 
In its White Paper "Buses", [ I ]  the British government sets out 
its proposals for creation of a freer local bus service sector 
than exists in any developed industrial economy in the world. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the basis and nature of 
the proposals, and particularly to assess the validity of the 
analysis that has been presented in support of them. 
The White Paper diagnosis of the bus industry is that a 
potentially virile sector is being stifled to such an extent by 
regulation that the variety and quality of service is poor, 
demand is unnecessarily low, and costs unnecessarily high. The 
prescription is for a heavy dose of free competition on the road 
between commercially motivated, financially autonomous companies, 
supported (lest the cure be worse than the disease) by tighter 
quality regulation, fair competition protections, and direct 
support of socially desirable unremunerative services. The 
prognosis is the elimination of cross-subsidy, the introduction 
of new types of service, and the establishment, essentially 
through market pressures, of the best attainable price/frequency/ 
quality combination consistent with the external finances 
available. 
The essence of the White Paper can be reduced to four 
propositions." 
1. Deregulation will produce a competitive market. 
2. Competition will substantially reduce costs. 
3 .  A competitive market will improve resource allocation. 
4. A competitive market will not cause any significant 
undesirable spin off effects. 
We shall examine each of these propositions in turn. 
1. THE WHITE PAPER PROPOSALS AND MARKET STRUCTURE 
The White Paper makes the simple assumption that the market is 
effectively contestable, so that either there will be 
competition, or at least, operators will have to behave as if the 
market is highly competitive in order to forestall entry. 
Either way, the outcome would be competitive prices, costs and 
services. In section 3 we shall examine whether such an 
outcome would be socially efficient. But now, we must question 
the validity of the assumption that local bus service is an 
effectively contestable market. We do so on two grounds. 
The first is that some markets are too small to sustain many 
operators. The unit of capacity (the bus) will be large in 
relation to the market, so that effective entry barriers will 
then exist. The second is that we do not start with a clean 
* We do not discuss here the proposals for the ownership 
structure of National.-.Bus Company or the PTEs and Municipal 
operators. 
sheet. In many markets, one at least of the incumbents will be 
a large operator which for historical reasons has achieved a 
position of market dominance. Even with the necessary measures 
in the White Paper requiring equal access to the concessionary 
pool, bus stations and so on, the network operator may retain a 
variety of advantages. These include demand-side factors such 
as the ability to offer a range of connections and forms of 
ticketing which enhance customer loyalty. They also include the 
sheer financial strength of large operators and their control 
over the second-hand bus market, which is itself by no means 
perfect. All of these _factors may leave entrants at a 
disadvantage. 
If these arguments have any force, then the implications for 
market structure need to be considered. One likely outcome is 
active small-group competition. The relevant model may then be 
that of oligopolistic rivalry. 
Consider the case in which new entry by a small operator against 
a large incumbent occurs. Both logic and experience suggest 
that he is likely to run just ahead of the existing operator, 
probably at lower fares. The likely response of the existing 
operator is to match the schedules and fares of the newcomer in 
an attempt to drive him out of the market, and at the same time 
offer a demonstration to other potential entrants of the likely 
consequences. 
The White Paper argues "this is not what will probably happen 
with totally free entry. If two competitors were to behave like 
that, the .profitability of both would be at risk." 
This rests on the article of faith that entry barriers are so low 
that incumbents will face such a strong threat of entry in all 
their profitable markets simultaneously, that they will lack the 
power, and the incentive, to engage in fighting tactics. 
In practice, the evidence is that tactics of this kind have 
occurred. The best example comes from the Hereford and 
Worcester Trial Area, where free entry on profitable urban routes 
has seen both free buses and simultaneous departures as 
competitive tactics. The TRRL monitoring exercise concluded 
that average revenues, at 51p per service mile had fallen to 
unsustainable levels. "It appears that the present situation in 
Hereford must be unstable, although the eventual outcome is 
unpredictable ...... Under present conditions, deregulation in 
itself may not be sufficient to allow small operators, however 
efficient, to compete successfully with established operators 
with greater resources." [23. 
Other evidence is slightly less persuasive, because it relates to 
cases of regulated competition under the 1980 Transport Act stage 
licensing procedures, rather than to a regime of unregulated 
competition. Here, a number of cases have featured schedule 
matching, including Erwash Travel (Nottingham) and Tally Ho 
Coaches Limited (South Devon). In the case of CK Coaches of 
Cardiff and Cardiff City Transport, public safety aspects 
surfaced, and both parties were warned by the Traffic 
Commissioners against unruly driving practices. In each of these 
cases schedule matching lasted for a considerable time, and it 
can be shown [31 that even if the low cost operator emerges 
victorious, a lengthy payback period is typically required to 
recoup the costs involved. 
A noteworthy feature of this type of case has been the role of 
the relevant regulatory bodies. In the Erewash and Tally Ho 
cases, pressure from the County Councils helped to end the 
schedule matching phase, while in another case (Felixstowe 
Omnibus), the Traffic Commissioner imposed licensing conditions, 
which prevented this type of behaviour. With the removal of 
these regulatory powers, the schedule matching phase may be 
further prolonged. 
As evidence of the effects of competition following from 
deregulation frequent reference is made in the White Paper to the 
experience of express deregulation under the 1980 Act. It is very 
doubtful, however, whether the experience of deregulation of the 
express business can teach us anything about what to expect from 
deregulation of stage carriage for three main reasons. 
Firstly, the express sector was, and is, unsubsidised and largely 
financially viable. Thus it presented a much more attractive 
market for new entry than the stage carriage business, where a 
much more limited part of the network remains profitable. 
Secondly, a major feature of regulation in the express sector was 
the protection of rail services from competition. Thus there 
was a large market awaiting coach invasion immediately regulation 
was lifted. Whether this effect of deregulation was desirable is 
open to question. Indeed, the evidence quoted on P.74 of the 
White Paper in respect of long distance commuter coaching suggest 
that it has cost other public transport operators a loss of £7.4117 
p.a. in revenue in return for a saving to commuters of E3m. p.a. 
If we assume that commuter coach operators are just breaking 
even, this would require a combination of net non-financial 
benefits to users and cost savings to established public 
transport operators to total S4.4m if commuter coach services 
were to be judged desirable. On balance, there is probably a 
net disbenefit to users when fares are excluded. Allowing for 
the effects on congestion and accidents would make the comparison 
even less favourable to commuter coaches. 
Thirdly, partly because of the presence of a close substitute and 
partly because of other factors, such as the mix of journey 
purposes, the express business is far more sensitive to price and 
quality changes than is the stage carriage. For the latter, 
mean price and mileage elasticities appear to be of the order of 
-0.3, +0.3. For express, Douglas [41 has estimated mean 
elasticities of -1.1 and +0.6 respectively. Consider the effect 
of new entry, which eliminates a 10% surplus (or reduces 
operating cost by 10%) on each of these types of service, whilst 
expanding bus miles run by 25%. Using a semilog demand function 
and reasonable parameter values (Appendix I ) ,  we find that on the 
local service, breaking even would actually require a 17% 
increase in fare. Provided that the buses were optimally 
scheduled, one would see a marginal increase in traffic of 3%; 
if the competitor simply duplicated existing timings, traffic 
would fall by 11% and price increase by a further 202 to break 
even. For the express example, by contrast, if there is no 
schedule matching, price could drop by 20% and volume rise by 
40%. With schedule matching, given that demand is price 
elastic, an even greater fall in price could be expected before 
capacity constraints started to bite. 
It is thus quite clear that the incentives to enter are far less 
in the stage carriage business than in the express, and the 
potential benefits far lower - indeed, as we shall argue, 
frequently negative. 
This leads us to conclude that, while rivalry a7d schedule 
matching may occur in some of the most attractive markets, 
elsewhere another solution is likely. This is recognised in the 
White Paper. 
"Otherwise, one [operator] might be forced to withdraw. 
But if there is enough demand to support two operators of the 
same kind of service, they will usually, in practice, agree to 
co-ordinate their services (subject to the provisions of the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Court)." 
We agree that monopoly or cartelisation of bus routes is a 
further possibility. But there is no specific discussion in the 
paper of whether a monopolistic outcome can be considered 
"competitive" or not. Clearly, if the market is perfectly 
contestable, then the monopolist will be unable to stray far from 
the competitive path without attracting entry. But we fear that 
too much faith is being placed on the threat of entry to regulate 
prices and output or, if that fails, on the ability of control 
institutions such as the Restrictive Trade Practice Court to 
regulate anti-competitive behaviour. In practice, distinguishing 
operating agreements which are in the public interest, such as 
timetable co-ordination, from those which may not be, such as 
agreements to reduce capacity, will be a regulatory minefield. 
In any case, we shall argue later that we see no reason to expect 
the agreed price/frequency combination to be that which yields 
the maximum benefit to the public consistent with breaking even. 
2. COMPETITION AND COSTS 
In the White Paper, it is suggested that one of the prime 
benefits of coqpetition will be reductions in unit costs. The 
scope for improved efficiency is examined in Appendix A to the 
Annex, where it is stated that NBC costs per vehicle mile are on 
average more than 25% below the PTE level, with private operators 
perhaps 30-40% below the-.NBC level. The conclusion drawn is that 
"the potential exists for cost reductions of up to 30% of total 
costs of public operators. Competition is the only way to secure 
and sustain these efficiency gains". (4.10) 
We do not quarrel with the proposition that there is scope for 
efficiency improvements in the bus industry. But we do suggest 
that the White Paper, while paying lip-service to the arguments, 
grossly underplays the effects of the patterns of work of the 
different types of operator on their unit costs. 
As an example, consider the four operators investigated by the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 1982 C51. From Table 1, it 
can be seen that the NBC subsidiaries Bristol and Trent had costs 
per vehicle mile some 60-702 of the West Midlands PTE and Cardiff 
City Transport. 
Table 1 
-- 
WMPTE CCT BOC THT 
80/81 80/81 80 80 
Cost (p) 
--
Vehicle mile 
Employees nos 0.112 0.123 0.109 0.082 
Vehicle mic('000s) 
Employee cost (E'000s) 9.259 8.475 6.757 6.944 
Employee nos 
Other cost (p) 
---
Vehicle miles 
Now, it is quite clear that each of the three ratios which 
together determine the cost per vehicle mile are themselves 
strongly influenced by the external environment as well as 
internal efficiency. Employees per vehicle mile will be partly 
determined by operating speeds and degree of peakiness. Cost per 
employee will be determined by local labour market conditions, 
amount of overtime and spreadover working, and other costs per 
vehicle mile will be influenced by speeds and operating 
conditions. 
We tried [6] to allow for these variations in the external 
conditions which the four operators face by standardising for the 
differences in average operating speed and the differences in 
peakiness, as measured by the peak vehicle requirement per 
million vehicle miles operated. The result was to cause the 
differences in cost/vehicle mile between the four operators more 
or less to disappear (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
-- 
PARAMETERS BOC TMT WMPTE CCT 
Av. speed PVR/million pence/ pence/ pence/ pence/ 
(mph) veh. miles mile mile mile mile 
Cost per BOC 13.7 21.72 103.3 103.9 107.5 102.9 
vehicle mile TMT 16.8 19.05 86.6 87.4 90.3 86.9 
to operate WMPTE 10.3 26.94 133.4 133.8 138.4 131.8 
service CCT 10.7 26.72 129.1 129.6 133.0 127.6 
pattern of: 
Thus, to operate the services of Bristol Omnibus Co., as 
represented by their average speed and peak characteristics, each 
of the four operators would have had costs per vehicle mile 
within 3%. If these 4 operators are at all representative, then 
most of the cost difference between the municipal sector and NBC 
operators is a product of the different external circumstances 
they face, rather than the result of different levels of internal 
efficiency. 
If similar arguments apply as between NBC and private sector 
ooerators then the taroet of a cut of 33% in unit costs for a . -  2 - 
- - given pattern of work will be difficult to achieve. Of course 
7- 
reported costs per vehicle mile may fall if the mix of wark 
changes, but that is an3ther issue. 
Supposing that a cost reduction does take place, it is important 
to consider its status. The WP presumes that a reduction in unit 
costs is synonymous with an improvement in ecoiomic efficiency. 
But this is simplistic. There are two ways in which an 
improvement in cost efficiency can come ab0.A:- wages per paid 
hour can fall or productivity (work hours per paid hour) can 
rise. If the first of these occurs, then the fall in costs is a 
pure transfer payment from workers to consumers or taxpayers. If 
the second happens, then insofar as workers are off their wark 
effort/wages equilibriun because of th- complexities of wage 
bargaining, the effect is part transfer payment, part efficiency 
gain. Glaister [7] quotes the Department of Transport's 
estimates. These are that for big buses, competition will cause 
drivers' wages to fall by 29% and utilisation to increase by 11%. 
Hence, any reduction in the money costs of running bus services 
represents predominantly a redistribution of welfare rather than 
a real efficiency gain. 
The White Paper quotes the case of the taxi and hire car business 
as evidence that competition brings pressure to keep down costs 
(para 1.7 . That evidence consists of the observation that 
over the period 1972 to 1982 operating costs of buses rose by 15 
to 30% in real terms, and fares by 30% whilst taxi fares rose by 
only 10%. That was despite the fact that the taxi business is 
even more labour intensive than the bus business. 
We do not dispute the statistics, which are consistent with the 
TRRL's evidence [a] .  But the interpretation that this represents 
a difference in costs due.to the pressures of cogpetition is very 
disputable for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the comparisons made relate to prices rather than costs. 
Public transport costs per passenger mile have increased partly 
due to a decline of patronage quite independently of the 
efficiency with which transport services are provided. Over the 
period 1972-82 passenger kilometres have declined by about 15% 
more than vehicle kilometres. This has been largely a result of 
conscious policy decisions to try to maintain the level of 
service rather than a result of inefficiency in restricting 
outputs. For taxis, what has been happening to utilisation is 
a little less clear. Coe and Jackson report "Given that real 
expenditure on taxis aid hire cars has risen by a factor of two 
over the last ten years, and that real fares have fallen, the 
number of passengers carried must have more than doubled. While 
increases in numbers of vehicles have been marked they have been 
proportionately less and this strongly indicates significant 
productivity gains. It is these productivity gains, probably 
facilitated by increasing use of radio, that have enabled real 
fare levels to fall". On the basis of those calculations the 
differences in fare trends would appear to be wholly explicable 
in terms of utilisation rates. Given that taxis do offer a 
higher quality of service at a higher price than buses one would 
expect increases in personal incomes to cause increases in taxi 
patronage and reductions of public transport patronage even if 
there were no change in relative prices. 
The White Paper gives the increase of real expenditure over the 
decade as only 30% and the increase of the number of taxis as 37% 
outside London and 22% in London. A weighted average of these 
figures gives an increase in fleet size of just under 30%. Even 
on this basis the bulk of the difference between the real price 
trends appears as a difference in the relevant effective 
utilisation rates. The pressures of competition appear to have 
very little to do with it. 
Secondly, the inference of the White Paper is that the taxi 
business is an unregulated business in which the outcomes are 
determined by the forces of competition. Of course that is not 
the case. In London, though entry is not restricted statutorily 
there is a high barrier to entry in the form of "the knowledge", 
and fares are regulated. Taxi licensing existed in 305 Of the 
369 county districts surveyed by Coe and Jackson. In 201 of 
these there was a binding constraint on the number of taxis 
operating. In 278 fares were controlled on a prescribed scale. 
The effect of these entry and price controls is thus that what is 
happening to prices is effectively determined not by competition 
and the level of costs. The equilibrating mechanism in these 
markets is either the level of service provided (in those 
districts where the entry constraint does not bind) or the quasi 
rent of the licence where the entry control kept profits above 
normal. Coe and Jackson reported evidence of trading in 
licences in 161 of the districts with a mean value of about 
£5000. In these circ~stances clearly utilisation rates were 
being maintained above the levels that would hsve prevailed with 
free entry. Whether free entry would have led to lower fares or 
lower utilisation rates and hence higher unit costs is 
indeterminate. Evidence from at least one of the cities where 
there is free entry, Santiago in Chile, suggests that a low 
utilisation high unit cost outcome may occur. But that is the 
subject of a lively current discussion. 
Taking these two points together it is clear that there is very 
little at all that one can deduce from the evidence of taxi fare 
trends about the effects of competition on costs. The arguments 
of the White Paper are spurious. 
- 
3. COMPETITION AND EFFICIENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
The authors of the White paper avoid directly confronting the 
resource allocation arguments and by implication suggest that 
any losses in this dimension are insignificant in comparison with 
the potential cost-efficiency effects. In this section we 
challenge that assertion by asking the following questions, none 
of which are adequately addressed in the White Paper:- 
(a) are public transport subsidies indeed incompatible with 
securing allocative efficiency? 
(b) if the Government budget is constrained, is cross- 
subsidisation consistent with alocative efficiency, and if 
so, what are the implications for regulatory policy? 
(c) is competition sure to throw up a pattern of fares and 
frequencies on bus routes which accords with consumers' 
preferences? 
(d) is quality competition, in the form of minibuses, likely to 
be commercially viable, and if so, does that automatically 
mean that it is socially efficient? 
(el is it true that the integration benefits offered by a 
planned system can in practice be secured through the 
market? 
(a) User cost'economies and the case for subsidy 
Even if there are no internal economies of scale in production, 
the fact that there are external economies of scale associated 
with the existence of user costs is the economic basis of the 
case for subsidies. This result, which was first demonstrated by 
Mohring, 191 relies 03 the fact that increases in frequency 
simultaneously raise capacity and improve service quality. A 
simple proof of the result is given in Appendix 2. 
The White Paper asserts that "in some of our 'major cities the 
cost of subsidising public transport is now unacceptable" (para 
1.3). In the supporting.Annex 2 it is conceded "This is not to 
deny the social case-' for subsidising some routes because 
otherwise  t h o s e  who l i ve  a long  o r  near  them would be dep r ived  a f  
a  va luab l e  s e r v i c e .  But t h e  m e r i t s  o f  such expend i t u r e  need t o  
be judged a g a i n s t  t h e  s o c i a l  va lue  o f  o t h e r  forms o f  p u b l i c  
expendi tu re"  ( p a r a  3 8 ) .  One might be tempted t o  draw t h e  
i n f e r e n c e  t h a t  such a  test had t h e r e f o r e  bsen condu-ted i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  urban s u b s i d i e s  and t h a t  they  had f a i l e d  t o  meet a "valuz 
f o r  mgney" c r i t e r i o n .  That i n f e r e n c e  would appear  t o  be 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  l e g i t i m a t e  a s  one of  t h e  a d v i s o r s  on t h s  Annex, Dr 
G l a i s t e r ,  was a l s o  t h e  o r i g i n a t o r  o f  t h e  procedure  o f  c o s t  
b e n e f i t  a p p r a i s a l  o f  urban revenue suppo r t  which t h e  Department 
i t s e l f  promulgated.  [ I 01  I t  would be r ea sonab l e  t o  expec t  a 
degree o f  cons i s t ency  between t h e  arguments o f  t h e  White Paper 
and t h e  conc lu s ions  reached from t h e  c o s t / b e n e f i t  ana ly se s .  
The i n i t i a l  c a l c u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  D.Tp. s tudy  i n  f a c t  showed t h a t  
t h e  marginal  b e n e f i t  c o s t  r a t i o  f o r  p u b l i c  t r a n s p o r t  revenue 
suppor t  i n  t h e  me t ropo l i t an  c n u n t i e s  exceedsd u l i t y  by a 
c o ns ide r ab l e  margin i n  a l l  excep t  South Yorkshire ( s e e  Table  3 ) .  
Table 3. Returns - to subsidy at the margin 
--
Marginal net benefit per* Changes required to 
£ of subsidy in the equate marginal 
existing situation when returns 
used to 
improve reduce services fares 
service fares 
Manchester - 0.3 +0.4 -18% -25% 
Merseyside -0.14 +0.3 - 4% - 6% 
5. Yorkshire broadly zero little change required 
W, Midlands + 0.2 +0.35 + 2% + 6% 
W, Yorkshire -0.25 +0.3 -15% -1 8% 
London Bus - 0.6 +I .05 -31% -28% 
London 
Underground + 0.8 
Source: Department of Transport (10) 
* This shows the position in 1982 for London and in 1980/81 for 
other areas. 
Those initial calculations used common estimates of the various 
relevant elasticities and could therefore b? improved 07 the 
basis of local evidence. In the context of preparing the Public 
Transport Plan appraisals of the value of subsidy, required under 
the 1983 Transport Act, the counties have reworked these 
calculations, and some of the results are given in Table 4 (see 
below). There is therefore a basis for answering the question 
whether subsidies give good value for money at the margin. 
Table 4. Marginal net benefits per E of subsidy* 
Subsidy used to 
Improve Fare 
Services Level 
Manchester +O. 53 +0.29 
Merseyside 4.79 +O .34 
South Yorkshire not available 
W .  Midlands ~0.61 +0.29 
W .  Yorkshire t0.25 - +O .35 
Tyne and Wear +I .41 +O .25 
* for the preferred plan options, 1985/6. 
Source: PTE Financial Plans 1985/6-1987/8. 
In practice the government has steadfastly argued that the 
Glaister cost benefit calculations are appropriate for testing 
the balance, between the support of fares and that of service 
levels and for examining the distribution of revenue support 
between counties, but not for determining the absolute level of 
-
subsidy which is justifiable. 
There appear to be four grounds on which that refusal might be 
defended: 
(i) that because there are "substantial leakages" of 
subsidy into cost increases the measured benefit cost ratios need 
deflation; 
The Department appears to make much of the 'leakage' argument. 
There are three major pieces of work to which it refers in 
support of this positon - one relying on a comparison of 
European countries [Ill and two referring to American conditions 
112, 3 The weakness of the evidence has been well documented 
by Collins [141, and we do no more than reiterate his main 
points. 
Correlation between rising costs and subsidy increases is almost 
certain to exist whether leakage is occurring or not. This is 
because many of the forces leading to cost increases (rising 
real wages, declining patronage) simultaneously lead to a need 
for increased subsidies. Thus we are thrown on to the rather 
weaker evidence regarding the lag structure of the relationship 
to see which effect comes first. But even if subsidy does raise 
unit costs, this need not represent leakage, but may well 
represent a deliberate and justified use of subsidies to raise 
wages and aid recruitment, to preserve relatively high-cost 
services; to improve vehicles, bus shelters, publicity, 
reliability or any of a host of factors that determine between 
them the quality of the service offered. Lastly, even if such a 
relationship does occur_ .in the United States, or in certain 
European countries, it may not exist in the very different 
institutional arrangements in Britain, where there are no 
earmarked sources of revenue support and financial controls are 
generally much tighter. 
Nothing we have said here proves that leakage does not occur. 
But it would require very much stronger evidence than anything 
published to date before we could even be reasonably certain of 
its existence in Britain, let alone of its msgnitude. 
(ii) that the high level of aggregation in the model leads 
to an overestimation of the benefits of support; 
We have seen no evidence to date to suggest that the degree of 
aggregation in the Glaister model overstates the benefits of 
public transport subsidy. Indeed, given the highly non-linear 
nature of congestion effects, we should rather suspect that, in a 
model which is based on average conditions over the day and 
across an entire county, any bias w~uld probably be in the 
reverse direction. 
(iii) that there is an economic distortion involved in the 
taxation which is necessary to fund public expenditures so that 
any expenditure needs to generate a direct benefit/cost ratio 
sufficiently above unity to compensate for these distortions; 
(iv) that in any case macro-economic constraints on public 
expenditure lead to a required beneFit-cost ratio in excess of 
unity; 
We would accept both these points in principle, but argue that 
the implications of neither of them, when examined in detail 
supports the assertion that urban public transport subsidy at the 
present level is economically unacceptable. Let us examine each 
of them in turn. 
Increased taxation msy cause an "excess burden" as a result of 
either reduced incentives to work in labw~r markets (in the case 
of direct taxatio?), or distortions of consumers choices between 
goods and services (in the case of indirect taxation). Dodgson 
[291 quotes both American and British research as yielding 
estimates of the aTpropriate shadow price of funds obtained 
through national taxes of about 1.1. 
For the local tax source, domestic rates, Dodgson obtains a 
shadow price estimate of 1.15. This is obtained with an average 
effective tax rate on the rental value of housing estimated as 
0.218, and a price elasticity of demand for housing of 0.6. 
Whilst Dodgson concedes that commercial and industrial rates will 
also impose welfare costs he finds no basis for a1 equivalent 
calculation. 
The context of the attack that is being made on the urban public 
transport subsidies is an,attempt to alter the allocation of 
funds between that parEicular expenditure and other possible 
expenditures in the transport sector, such as local road 
investments, road maintenance, etc. If it were not so then the 
imposition of some coitrols on the amount of funding to be 
provided for local transport expenditures by central government 
would be a sufficient control. 
Within transport sector expenditures, of course, the disparity of 
the set of relevait casts and benefits is much snaller than 
between transport aid othsr sectors. The value of time, 
environmental effects, the value of life, etc are just as 
relevant to the appraisal ~f public transport expenditures as to 
road expenditures and there does not appear to be any valid 
reason why the samne conventions of valuation should not apply. 
In fact, the initial Glaister model calculations included a 
narrower set of benefits than those applied to road schemes. 
They did not, for example, include aiy safety bensfit 
calculations. Some analysis of the London fares changes by 
Professor Allsop [ I51  has suggested that the returns to the 
public transport subsidies would increase substantially if 
accident savings were included. The onission of any formal way 
of treating environmental or distributional effects within the 
calculations is of course parallelled in the appraisal of road 
schemes where it has on occasion been used to justify investment 
in schemes with a neasured benefit/cost ratio of less than one (a 
negative net present valus in NPV terms). If anything, 
therefore, the pxblic transport appraisals have been less 
comprehensive thsn road,investment appraisals and a lower ratio 
of measured benefits to coats should bs acceptable. 
Our conclusion on this dimensioi of the diagnosis follows. The 
assertion thst current levels of pxblic transport subsldy are 
unacceptable ignores the importance of external ecanomies 
associated with user costs and is in-onsistent with the results 
of the application of the Department's o m  techniques of cast 
benefit appraisal to alternative forms of expenditure. Whilst 
there are valid reasons to look for a benefit/cost ratio in 
excess of 1, we see no reason to doubt that existing subsidy 
levels represent good value for money in the majority of cases. 
(b) Cross-subsidy and the economics of the second best. 
The White Paper states that "over time, competition will elimi- 
nate cross-subsidy" (Para 4.11 ). This is stated to bz a good 
thing because; 
- cross-subsidy hastens the decline of bus services, 
- cross-subsidy "requires some passengers to take 00 their 
shoulders the burden of maintaining services for other bus 
users regardless of their ability to d~ so. 
Para. 4.13 of the White -Paper reads: 
"That k ind  of  c ross - subs idy  ha s  pe rve r s e  e f f e c t s .  It r a i s e s  
f a r e s  on t h e  m3re heav i l y  used r o u t e s  h igher  t h a n  is  necessa ry  
f o r  p r o f i t a b l e  o p e r a t i o n  i n  o rde r  t o  p rese rve  s e r v i c e s  f o r  which 
t h e r e  is  less demand. So it d r i v e s  people  away from us ing  buses .  
Fare  r i s e s  l e a d  t o  a  l o s s  o f  patronage equa l ,  on average ,  t o  
about  3  pe r  c e n t  f o r  every 10 pe r  c e n t  r e a l  f a r e  i n c r e a s e .  Thus, 
f a r  from p r o t e c t i n g  bus s e r v i c e s ,  cross-subsidy h a s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  
r a t e  o f  t h e i r  dec l i ne" .  
This  paragraph is g r o s s l y  mis leading.  Suppose t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  
r o u t e  is making a  l o s s  o f  % p e r  passenger  on a  volume o f  q, 
passengers .  Closure  o f  t h i s  r o u t e  would t h e r e f o r e  y i e l d  a  s av ing  
of  E L q ,  t o  reduce f a r e s  o? p r o f i t a b l e  r o u t e s .  Suppose t h a t  t h e  
p r o f i t a b l e  r o u t e s  c a r r y  q  passengers  a t  a  f a r e  o f  p,: We may 
then  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  p e r c e n h g e  r educ t i on  i n  revenue r e q u i r e d  on 
p r o f i t a b l y  rou t e s :  
L r educ t i on  i n  f a r e s  on 100 l- q . 
p r o f i t a b l e  r o u t e s  (assuming = 
an e l a s t i c i t y  o f  0.3) P LqLo.7  
76 rise i n  volume on t h e  0.3 100 2. o .  
p r o f i t a b l e  r o u t e s  
Absolute  rise i n  volume 0.3 t a .  
' I  
on t h e  p r o f i t a b l e  r o u t e s  
0.7 p  
L 
This  w i l l  exceed t h e  psssenger  numbsrs on t h e  u n p r o f i t a b l e  r o u t e  
i f :  
I n  o t h e r  words, o ~ l y  i f  t h s  l o s s  p s r  passenger  on t h e  
u n p r o f i t a b l e  r o u t e s  is well wder tw ice  t h e  mean f a r e  psr 
passenger  on t h e  p r o f i t a b l e  r w ~ t e s  w i l l  t h e  removal of  c r o s s  
subs idy  boos t  p a t r o i a g s .  I t  may a l s o  be shown t h a t  i f  both 
r o u t e s  have t h e  ssme p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  d,:mand and both are 
o p e r a t i n g  wi th  s p a r e  c a p a c i t y ,  then a  psssenger  maximiser would 
charge t h e  same f a r e  on both rog t e s .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  c ross - subs idy  
w i l l  y i e l d  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  passenger  t r i p s  whenever it is used t o  
suppo r t  r o u t e s  whose o p e r a t i n g  r a t i o  ( revenue over  avo idab l e  
c o s t )  is  b e t t e r  t han  30%. In  o t h e r  words, i n  very  msny 
c i rcumstances ,  c ross - subs idy  w i l l  r a i s e  bus  pa t ronage  r a t h e r  t h a n  
reduc ing  it. .-. .. 
This does - not prove that cross-subsidy is always socially 
desirable and indeed we do not so argue. But it is clear that 
the solution to the second-best problem of maximising social 
benefit subject to a budget constraint is likely to contain 
cross-subsidy. Appendix 2 shows that the first best solution to 
the optimisation problem involves subsidies due to the "Mohring 
effect". The second best solution, if first best subsidies are 
not available, involves prices in the more heavily patronised and 
the less price elastic routes which are further above first best 
price levels than on "thin" and price elastic routes. 
As an example, we have. extended one of the illustrative 
calculations by Nash (16)  to show the result of eliminating cross 
subsidy. It is seen from Table 2 that, in the absence of any 
subsidy, the social welfare maximising policy involves a 
substantial degree of cross-subsidy from route A to route B. If 
the introduction of competition makes such cross-subsidy 
impossible, then each route will have to break even individually. 
The result is a significant reduction in social welfare. Details 
of the example are given in Appendix 2. 
Table 5. Net social benefit maximisation example 
Overall breakeven Breakeven on 
each route- 
--
Route I 
-- 
Price 
Miles 
Revenue 
Cost 
Profit 
Route 2 
-- 
Price 
Miles 
Revenue 
Cost 
Profit 
Overall 
Change in net Base 
social benefit 
Passenger miles 77.0 73.4 
The second argument is d-veloped further in Annex 2 to ths Wnite 
Paper (paras 33 - 45). Two main p3ints are made. Firstly, 
"users of good routes are being penalised by being made to pay 
excessive fares in relation to the costs of the service they 
use, s~ the principle of cross-subsidy, rather than of direct 
subsidy from p~hlic funds, can mean that the public transport 
services of the less prosperous areas are being taxed to cover 
the deficits in more prosperous areas". Secondly, cross- 
subsidy "leaves to operators for decision matters that should 
not bs so left". This argunent continues "services which the 
market does n3t provide and which therefore need subsidy if they 
are nevertheless to continus should get that subsidy only by 
decision of elected representatives after proper testing that 
they represent good value for money and within the resources 
available to them." 
The thrust of this argunent is t h s  that any subsidy of loss 
making services should, bgth for reasons of equity and of 
democratic accountability, be financed directly from taxpayers on 
the basis of the appraisal of their value for money, rather than 
indirectly from other users. Whether this would lead to a 
reduction in the amount of subsidy for uiremunerative services or 
not is left conceptually indeterminate. 
If the real alternatives presented by the White Paper ware direct 
or indirect financing of a given amount of support of 
unremunerative service.-. ..ws would ollrselves choose direct 
subsidies. But that is not what is implied. It is clearly 
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  l e v e l  o f  e x t e r n a l  subs idy  is t o  be 
d ec r ea sed ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t  on t h e  unremunerat ive  s e r v i c e s  is a 
r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  level o f  subs idy  by an  amount e q u a l  t o  t h e  
o v e r a l l  r e d u c t i o n ,  - p l u s  t h e  amount o f  i n t e r n a l l y  genera ted  
s u ppo r t  e l i m i n a t e d ,  minus a i y  s av ings  i n d i r e c t l y  a c c r u i n g  through 
cheaper  o p e r a t i o n  consequent  on d s r e g u l a t i o n ,  minus t h e  s p e c i a l  
i n t e r i m  g r a n t  o f  £20 m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  f i r s t  year .  
Let us  make some c a l c u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  e f f e c t  on t h e  
l e v e l  o f  subs idy  o f  u i r e n u n e r a t i v e  r u r a l  s e r v i c e s ,  u s ing  t h e  
White Papers  own e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  magnitudes invo lved .  A s  we 
have a raued  e a r l i e r ,  we b e l i e v e  t h e s e  t o  b s  undulv f avou rab l e  t o  
t h e  c a s e  f o r  d e r e g u l a t i o n  becau.;e o f  t h e  u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y  h igh  
e s t i m a t e  g iven  f o r  a ch i evab l e  c o s t  r educ t i ons .  
S h i r e  county revenue suppo r t  is s a i d  t o  b s  approach ing  £100 
m i l l i o n .  The r a t i o  o f  i n t e r n a l  t o  e x t e r n a l  g e n e r a t i o n  o f  
s u b s i d i e s  g iven  by t h e  j o i n t  NBC/D.Tp s t udy  of  Taunton was 3 t o  
1 ,  which i f  g e n e r a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  would g i v e  an i n t e r n a l  c r o s s  
s u bs idy  gene r a t i on  of  £300 m i l l i o n .  That would be  l o s t .  On a 
t u r n o v e r  f o r  t h e  s e c t o r  o f  £600 m i l l i o n  a 30% c o s t  r e d u c t i o n  
wauld reduce  t h e  nsed f o r  subs idy  by S180 m i l l i o i ,  t o  which we 
should  add t h e  £20 m i l l i o n  i n t e r i m  psyment. £250 n i l l i o n  less 
would t h e r e f o r e  be needed from revenus suppor t .  A n e t  r e d u z t i o n  
o f  subs idy  t o  unremunerat ive  s e r v i c e s  o f  £100 m i l l i o n  is t h e r e -  
f o r e  impl ied  wi thout  a i y  s av ing  t o  t h e  exchequor. I f ,  a s  h s s  
been i n d i c a t e d ,  d e r e g u l a t i o n  would b e  t aken  as t h s  o p p o r t u i i t y  t o  
reduce  e x t e r n a l  s , ~ b s i d y  l e v e l s  t hen  t h e  l 0 : 3 ~  o f  s ~ p p 3 r t  f o r  
unremunerat ive  s e r v i c e s  would be even g r e a t e r .  
That c a l c u l a t i o n  makes it q u i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  Wnite Paper 
p roposa l  is not  t o  r e p l a c e  i n t e r n a l  cross-subsicly by e x t e r n a l  
s u bs idy ,  b u t  t o  r e p l a c e  a system wi th  an exogenously dstermined 
e x t e r n a l  subs idy  p l u s  i n t e r n a l  subs idy  supplementa t ion  by a 
system wi th  t h e  same, 07 less, e x t e r n a l  subs idy  wi thout  any 
i n t e r n a l  su?plementat ion.  The l o g i c a l l y  c o r r e c t  test o f  t h e  
p r o p o s a l s  is t h e r e f o r e  t o  compare t h e  w e l f a r e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e s e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  as we hsve i l l u s t r a t e d  above. 
The ba l ance  betwesn f a r e s  and s e r v i c e  l e v e l s  under c )  - --
compe t i t i on  
P u t t i n g  a s i d e  t h e  i s s u e s  o f  subs idy  a ~ d  c ross - subs idy ,  a very  
impor tan t  q . ~ e s t i o n  remains  as t o  whether f r e e  compe t i t i on  w i l l  
n e c e s s a r i l y  l e a d  t o  t h e  b e s t  combination O F  f a r e s  a i d  f r equenc i e s  
s ' ab j ec t  t o  a breakeven c o n s t r a i n t .  I t  is e a ~ y  t o  show t h a t  an  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p m i t i o n ,  wi th  o p e r a t o r s  b reak ing  even and wi th  no 
i n c e n t i v e  t o  expa id  o r  c o n t r a c t ,  cou ld  occur  a t  any o f  a set o f  
co mbina t i o i s  o f  f a r e  and by!; miles. 
I f  C = C (F)  and Q = 3 (P,F)  
where 
C = t o t a l  c o s t  
F = f requency .-. .. 
Q = no o f  pa s senge r s  c a r r i e d  
P = fare per trip 
Then breakeven is given by: 
Generally, this will represent a whole locus of possible 
combinations of price and frequency at which the industry may 
break even. 
At any point on this locus, an operator who placed one extra bus 
on the road would expect to gain P. Q(P.F)B in revenue 
F 
(where P.Q(P,F) is the average revenue per trip and B is the 
F 
number of trips made per bus). Assuming constant costs per 
trip, he will incur costs of C(F) . These must equal P. Q(P,F) B F F 
to just break even or in other words C(F) : P. Q(P,F), as stated 
above. 
Thus, at any point on this locus, there is no incentive for entry 
to or exit from the industry. 
It is possible that when new entry occurs, on profitable routes, 
the original operator may so cut mileage that - assuming the new 
entrants' costs are the same as his own - the original 
combination of fare and bus miles is re-established. But it is 
more likely that he will resist such a cut, leading to an 
expansion in service levels. Thus a new equilibrium could be 
established at higher bus mileages and higher fares. 
-
Indeed 
this has often been what has happened abroad when taxi fares and 
numbers have been deregulated 1171. If the original position was 
in some sense a planned optimum then - in the absence of a cut in 
costs or profits - obviously this new position would be inferior 
in terms of this objective. Yet it is the result of 
commercially viable new entry. This is the key point: there is 
no mechanism whereby the free market will ensure an optimal 
combination of fares and frequencies. Indeed, this point is 
acknowledged in a paper by Beesley and Glaister on the taxi 
industry where they argue that it is likely that a free market 
will tend towards maximising the number of operators able to 
survive - in other words, a high fare high frequency 
combination [18]. 
Clearly, then, new entry can only be of benefit in the following 
circumstances: 
- if the existing operator is providing non-optimal (and 
probably sub-optimal frequencies). 
- If the new entrant has significantly lower costs, and/or 
competition forces costs down. In the example in Appendix 1, even 
the small increase in-traffic yielded by a 10% all round cost 
reduction only occurs if the operators co-ordinate their services 
optimally. If they practice duplication of timings, then even 
with a 10% cost cut, traffic will fall. 
- If the previous operator was making a surplus on the route 
in question, which is eliminated by competition. In this case 
the question is whether the benefit to users is larger than the 
loss of profit to the operator (or the loss of benefit to other 
users if this profit was used to cross-subsidise other 
services).We have already indicated that it is quite possible 
that a 10% profit margin could be eliminated with little- or even 
negative - benefit to users of the route in question. In our 
example in Appendix 1, there is a clear disbenefit to both 
operators and users if timings are merely duplicated at the 
higher fare. But even when an optimal schedule is negotiated, 
the net user benefits - at £112 - do not compensate for the loss 
of £117 profit. 
(d) Quality competiton 
It is suggested (Annex 2 Para 16) that there may be a substantial 
market for minibuses, shared taxis and other intermediate modes, 
providing a form of new entry with different consequences from 
those analysed above. It appears from Para 1.6 of the White 
Paper itself that it is believed to be in city centres that 
"competing minibuses may offer a fast and frequent service". 
Minibuses are used extensively in Third World cities to provide 
public transport services. However, these cities are generally 
characterised by excess demand for public transport and a 
plentiful supply of cheap labour. In Britain, both past studies 
19, 20) and experience (e.9. Harlow, Harrogate) have suggested 
that minibuses are a very expensive way of providing public 
transport services, appropriate - if at all - only where physical 
factors prevent access by a larger bus or where traffic is 
consistently very low, with no peaks justifying a larger vehicle. 
Viable urban operations have not seemed feasible. 
Three recent papers challenge this view. The first is the work 
of Glaister [7], which was specially commissioned by DTp. 
Glaister concludes that on high density urban routes, minibuses 
could sucessfully capture a substantial proportion of the market 
even when operating at four times the fare charged on 
conventional buses; on lower density routes they would 
completely supplement the big bus. We attach a critique of this 
paper in Appendix 3. Suffice it to say that we believe these 
conclusions arise from a number of unrealistic assumptions, which 
lead to both large and small buses having very low fares (so that 
the absolute price penalty of the minibus is understated) and to 
big buses having very long waiting times, so that the advantage 
of the minibus is grossly overstated. 
Using Glaister's assumptions about costs, we may compare costs 
per place mile for large and small buses at current and 
competitive cost level,.-.a.ssuming an average speed of 6.88 m.p.h. 
for large buses and 7.74 for small (below) 
TABLE 6 
Big bus Small bus Capacity Relative 
cost per cost per Large Small cost per 
vehicle mile vehicle mile mile 
Current 2.1297 1.2957 88 15 3.57 
Competitive 1.3296 0.8377 88 15 3.70 
If we assume, as Glaister does, the same proportionate subsidy 
and the same load factors for the twotypes of bus, it is clear 
that minibus fares must be nearly 4 times big bus fares. Let us 
take a realistic example of a big bus service charging 20p for a 
2 mile journey. The small bus fare will be 71p. In vehicle 
time savings will be slightly under 2 minutes. We may calculate 
the necessary time savings for the small bus to offset 
passengers' money losses as - 51 - 2, where V is the value of 
2v 
time of the passenger (assumed doubled for waiting time). We 
calculate this for each of Glaister's three categories of 
passenger. It is clearly unlikely that even high value of time 
passengers will benefit from using the minibus; low value of 
time passengers would certainly greatly disbenefit. 
TABLE 7 
Waiting Time Savings Necessary for Passengers to 
- -
Benefit from Usins Minibuses 
Value of Necessary Waiting Time Savings 
Time 
Existing Load Double Minibus Double Both 
Factor Load Factor Load Factors 
High (2.4 p/m) 8.6 1.33 
Medium (1.35 p/m) 16.9 3.93 
Low (0.57 p/m) 42.7 12.04 
The only way in which minibus operation could be commercially 
attractive is if they were able to achieve much higher load 
factors than conventional buses. For instance, if they achieved 
double the load factor, then the cost ratio would be reduced to 
1.8. Reworking the above calculations, the fare on minibuses 
would be 36p and the necessary time savings 16 - 2, or for 
-
2v 
the three categories of passenger as shown in Table 2. 
It would now seem more likely that high value of time passengers 
would prefer the minibus, although low value passengers would 
certainly still prefer c-gnventional buses. However, we must ask 
what sort of policy minibus operators would need to follow to 
achieve such an increase in load factors. Probably it would 
involve: 
1. Reducing peak capacity to the level which can achieve high 
off-peak utilisation (unless part-time operators could be 
found for peak extra work). 
2. Shuttling on the more heavily used parts of the route, with 
few or no buses proceeding to the extremities. 
3. Operating few or no services in the early morning, evening 
and on-Sunday. 
But big bus operators who adopted the same tactics could achieve 
much higher load factors too. If they also doubled their load 
factors, they would become much more attractive (Table 7). 
A second paper by Walters [21], produces some very surprising 
results on optimal bus size. He concludes (under given 
assumptions) that the greater the volume of traffic, the smaller 
the optimal bus. He argues that typical urban buses in developed 
countries are far too large, and also that as a result of taking 
into account the bus size decision, the economies of scale noted 
by Mohring (1972) whereby increases in traffic volumes lead to 
some combination of reduced bus operating costs and reduced 
waiting times, are probably trivially small. 
All of these conclusions appear to follow from a simple error in 
Walters' model. He introduces variables for the flow of 
passengers (p), the size of bus ( A )  and the waiting time for a 
standard bus (v) without noticing that - given optimal behaviour 
- v is uniquely determined by p. 
Allowing for this relationship radically changes the results from 
the modal. Given Walters own assumptions, it appears that bus 
loads in the range 28 - 35 (implying somewhat larger capacities 
in view of stochastic variations in demand) are optimal on 
typical urban routes. Only where the flow is very light would 
something significantly smaller than a standard bus be optimal, 
and even this result may well be altered by the presence of peaks 
in demand. In British conditions, the costs quoted in Glaister 
[7] suggest a smaller cost saving from using small vehicles; thus 
the optimal bus size will be larger still. 
The complete argument is reproduced in Appendix 4. We conclude 
that Walters has failed to show a case for using smaller buses on 
typical urban routes; moreover, even when allowing for variable 
bus size, the economies of scale in bus operations due to the 
'Mohring' effect remain very significant. 
The third paper is a recent piece of unpublished work [221 by Bly 
and Oldfield of TRRL. Unlike Walters, they conclude that there 
is no case for completely replacing conventional buses by 
minibuses. However, they do conclude that - by operating at 
high load factors and creaming traffic - a limited number of 
minibuses may give their passengers waiting time savings which 
exceed the disadvantages to other passengers of fewer big buses 
and of increased congestion. We note that regulation is still 
required to restrict their numbers, however, for otherwise 
commercial incentives lead to their expansion to a level at which 
the net disbenefits of minibuses are very large. We note also 
that the entry of a high price minibus service, leading to fewer 
big buses themselves at higher fare (due to reduced load 
factors), would seriously penalise poorer public transport users. 
Thus our conclusions are: 
- Minibus services could only be commercially viable by 
operating at high load factors over the better sections of 
route, with few peak extra, evening or Sunday services. 
- The consequences of this would be to force big bus operators 
to a combination of reduced services and higher fares. 
- In some circumstances it is conceivable that there would be 
net benefits as a result, although we are worried about the 
distributive consequences of such a change. 
- However, the number of minibuses needs to be restricted, and 
the case for minibus entry needs judging on its merits in 
each individual context. (It is noteworthy that the 
current Secretary of State has recently refused entry to 
AMOS in London. ) 
Thus we conclude that retention of regulation to enable the 
authorities to limit minibus entry is essential: more work needs 
to be done to establish when, if at all, minibus entry really is 
to the public good. 
(e) Integration 
The WP argues (Para. 4:14) that loss of the benefits of 
integration will be small, because where customers need 
comprehensive information and connecting services, the free 
market will automatically provide them. 
It is important to understand at the outset that the benefits of 
integrated public transport planning, whilst they include 
provision of comprehensive information, connecting services and 
through ticketing, go far beyond these issues. Fundamentally, 
the point is that the best value for money is obtained from a 
limited amount of support if the fares and services of an area 
are planned jointly with that aim in view. Fares differentials 
may then be established according to second-best principles 
rather than the profitability of individual routes. The optimal 
trade-off between highly discriminatory complex systems and less 
discriminating simple ones can be established. Routes, services 
and frequencies may be optimised allowing for the important 
interactions between them - not just as feeders to each other, 
but also as competitors where routes physically overlap or their 
catchment areas do so. Of course, we accept that such network 
planning will be far from perfect, and indeed the computerised 
techniques which hold high promise of improvements are still in 
their infancy. But we believe that the experience of integrated 
network and fares planning provided by the PTE's, the NBC MAP 
project and the more active shire counties (e.9. Lancashire) is 
sufficiently encouraging to suggest that more systematic 
planning, not less, is required. Some of the ways in which the 
White Paper proposals will make such integration unlikely or 
impossible are discussed below: 
(i) Such integration almost always involves elements of cross- 
subsidy (see above, and the examples given in Nash, (15, p56, et 
seq.) 
(ii) Integration involves exploiting the economies of scale 
enjoyed by rail transport when it is present, by designing bus 
networks to complement the rail service and by attractive 
ticketing packages. Much progress has been made on this in 
the PTE's (particularly, of course, Tyne and Wear). Yet if 
subsidies are inadequate to permit prices which fully reflect the 
low marginal cost of rail, it will be subject to threat of bus 
competition at lower fares, in circumstances in which this will 
cost the rail service revenue greatly in excess of any cost 
savings it can make. The result will be higher subsidies and/or 
higher fares and poorer services for remaining rail users. This 
will occur not just in PTE areas, but also on most Provincial 
inter-urban routes, where the possibility for profitable inter- 
urban bus operation exists. There is a clear need for a 
mechanism to weigh up the benefits of new competition on routes 
against the costs. 
(iii) Simplified ticketing systems and travelcards hold great 
attractions both in marketing and in administrative cost, as the 
London Transport experience and the West Yorkshire simplification 
and 3Op off-peak fares have amply demonstrated. Yet such schemes 
inevitably result in temptation to the small operator to undercut 
them on healthier routes and times. It is unlikely that the 
existing operator could offer a side-payment to the small 
operator to keep his fare up, or that this would be legal. Thus, 
emergence of competition may well require existing operators to 
abandon such schemes. In any event, the offers rest on the 
ability to provide some support on a network basis rather than 
for individual routes, and the presence of a body charged with 
performing a co-ordinating role. 
(iv) Sensible route planning often dictates that the best way to 
serve particular communities is often by combining them with 
other more lucrative destinations. Of course, it needs checking 
that the benefits to the additional communities served exceed the 
losses to other passengers, but this is sure to be the case in 
many instances. Now consider an operator running from A to B via 
C. A new competitor enters on the direct route, offering a 
marginally faster service direct from A to B. The existing 
operator must retaliatG,' either by ceasing to serve C or by 
reducing his fares from A to B to such a level that they 
compensate for the slightly longer journey time. In the first 
case, passengers to and from C are seriously inconvenienced for 
the sake of a very minor benefit to passengers between A and B. 
In the second, the operator will require a greatly increased 
subsidy. He cannot recoup the substantial benefit to inhabitants 
of C in his revenue partly because it is not practical in bus 
operations to price-discriminate in sufficiently fine detail to 
extract a substantial proportion of the consumers surplus and 
partly because in any case it is hardly feasible to charge a 
shorter distance fare from A to C which is higher than the (now 
reduced) longer distance one from A to B. Thus there is no way 
in which a free market will lead to the optimal routeing of the 
service via C. 
(v) Similar problems arise when relying on the free market to 
provide connecting services, through ticketing etc. Such 
measures invariably require administrative cost, and frequently 
loss of revenue or increased operating cost for at least one 
party. Where connections are implemented which attract 
additional traffic, they will of course benefit most the operator 
with the highest fare for his part of the journey. In principle, 
he could pay the other operator a sufficient side payment to 
ensure that the connection is made, or - if through ticketing is 
adopted - agree to a non proportional sharing of the proceeds. 
But there remain two problems. Firstly, it will not be possible 
for the operators between them to recoup in revenue all of the 
benefits to users, because of the problem of extracting 
consumers' surplus referred to above, and because the through 
fare cannot exceed the sum of the two individual fares. 
Secondly, in a complicated network of many routes and many 
operators it is most unlikely that optimal side-payments and 
revenue sharing agreements will emerge because of the 
administrative costs involved. An overall co-ordinating body has 
been found necessary to achieve this; hence the growth of PTE 
type institutions throughout Western Europe, North America and 
Australia. 
(vi) In a network of many operators, information to the public on 
routes, times and stopping places becomes a real problem. It is 
conceivable that such a service to the public might be provided 
on a commercial basis, but in the vast majority of cases in 
Britain and elsewhere in Western Europe of which the authors are 
aware in which printed material or enquiry offices handling 
enquiries concerning a number of operators exist, they have been 
provided by public authorities. In the many cases in Britain 
where neither shire counties nor tourist boards provide this 
service, it does not exist even in areas with a reasonable array 
of different operators. 
Overall, then, we conclude that sensible integration requires the 
presence of a public body with overall responsibility for co- 
ordinating routes, times and fares. The free market will not 
achieve this both because changes in revenue will grossly 
understate the benefits to users and because suitable schemes of 
revenue sharing and side-payments will be too complex to be 
achieved in practice. 
4, UNDESIRABLE SPIN-OFF EFFECTS 
A number of the undesirable consequences which may follow 
deregulation are discussed in the WP. The most important are as 
follows: 
(a) Safety 
The White Paper authors regard the maintenance of safety 
standards as being a matter of the utmost importance, and we 
welcome the promise of additional resources to this end. 
Nevertheless, we note that the White Paper produces no evidence 
on the likely scale of the problem following the entry of many 
small operators with, in many cases - we suspect - minimal 
maintenance facilities. One of our students has examined the 
maintenance record of existing bus operators by fleet size in the 
Yorkshire traffic area [31. He found a steady reduction in 
prohibition and defect notices as fleet size increased (Table 
81, with a tenfold increase n the rate far fleets of up to 3 
compared with those of over 50. While the result of this sample 
survey should be treated with due caution, we judge that the task 
of ensuring safety standards in an industry with many more small 
firms will greatly increased. Until the Government's detailed 
proposals are made public, it is impossible to judge their 
adequacy for the task. 
Table 8 
Maintenance Record of Bus Operators 
Fleet 
-
No of 
-
Size Operators 
-
(b) Congestion 
Congestion imposes real resource costs in terms of both time and 
operating costs, via the-speed-flow-cost relationship. The White 
Paper makes the valid point that congestion is only serious at 
limited times and places. Nevertheless, the indications are 
that if the pcu values and speed/flow curves are to be believed, 
minibuses could aggravate city congestion substantially. Thus, 
Glaister 171 finds that minibus competition might reduce road 
speeds in London by anything up to 1 mph, after allowing for a 
transfer of 13.7% of the new bus passengers from car and taxi. 
To prevent a fall in speeds, the share of the market taken from 
cars or taxi would need to be some 30-45%. Bly and Oldfield [22] 
show that if minibuses succeed to the extent of becoming as much 
as half the big bus flow, then traffic congestion becomes 
appreciably worse, with a fall of some 0.3 m.p.h. (24%). Some 
back of envelope calculations based on the Glaister model inputs [lo] suggest that a fall in road speed of that magnitude in 
London and the Metropolitan Counties would impose time losses 
valued at some £30 million per annum and vehicle operating costs 
of £10 million p.a. These figures exclude the effect of a fall 
in speeds on bus operating costs themselves. 
(c) Loss of service 
The White Paper argues that competition will to ensure that the 
community gets better value for money from subsidised 
services.. . . ."In each of the (Trial) areas, the county has been 
able to obtain better value for subsidy payments, and in n m e  has 
deregulation brought the loss of services which some predicted," 
(Para 1.9) 
It is not our understanding that the intention of the Trial Area 
experiments was to replace regulation by Traffic Commissioner 
with regulation by County Council. Nevertheless, we agree with 
the White Paper that, particularly in rural ares, where bus 
networks are simple, competitive tendering for services, either 
on a franchise or a contract basis is a sound commercial 
practice. The evidence from Hereford and Worcester is clearly 
that independent operators are willing and able to produce low 
density services at lower operating costs than NBC. Provided 
that they can sustain services at these costs and that the 
relevant quality conditions are met, there is every reason for 
giving the contracts to the lowest tenderer. 
The question of whether service will be lost in rural areas then 
depends entirely on whether the cost effciency savings are 
sufficient to counterbalance any loss of revenue support and 
cross-subsidy (see section 3(b)) which in turn depends on how the 
Government slices the diminished subisdy cake. As a matter of 
fact, services were lost in at least one of the Trial Areas (see 
-
Table 9), and the White Paper statement "there has been no 
massive decline in service to the rural communities in these 
areas" (Para 4.6) treads a fine line in semantics. 
The more difficult issue is the likely impact of removing cross- 
subsidy and reducing external subsidy on bus service in the more 
urbanised areas. Here, the intention is that 
.-. .. 
'where operators can finance their services through the 
fare box, what is provided should be left to be determined 
in the market. Services which the market does not provide 
and which, therefore need subsidy if they are nevertheless 
to continue should get that subsidy only by decision of 
elected representatives after proper testing that they 
constitute good value for public money, and within the 
resources available to them'. 
(Annex 2, Para 40). 
In passing, we note the difficulty of defining the "commercial 
sector" - are all bus routes which are capable of breaking even 
at some fare/frequency combination, however poor, to be deemed 
"viable services determined under commercial pressures" (para 41) 
snd not eligible for subsidies? In any event, none of the Trial 
Area experiments gives us any useful evidence about whether 
service may be lost under actual competition, as opposed to 
competitive tendering. 
North Norfolk Trial Area 
Table 9 Bus Journeys per week (both ways) 
---
TOTAL of which 
INDEPENDENT 
1981 639 
1983 389 
1984 (Jan) 380 
Source R.G. Harman - Surveyor, March 15th 1984 
To gauge the effects of removing internal cross-subsidy, we must 
therefore look to desk studies rather than real-life experiments. 
Here, the White Paper strikes an uncharacteristic note of 
caution, citing the wide variations in the importance of cross- 
subsidy in the different areas studied. This is clearly true - 
at a recent conference profitable routes in Bedfordshire were 
said to generate £1/2 million surplus, internal cross-subsidy in 
Plymouth was worth £3/4 million, yet there were said to be only 3 
profitable routes out of 200 in Hertfordshire. No global sums 
are possible without the relevant data. Yet the White Paper 
critique of regulation and subsidy concludes (Para 45) 
'with some limited exceptions, which could arise in both 
town and country, there is no reason to suppose that the 
availability of local bus services will be radically 
affected by the loss of cross-subsidy implicit in opening up 
the industry to competition. Its loss should be offset by 
the gains from the more effectively (sic) use of direct 
subsidy made possible'. 
This last assertion that cost efficiency gains will be sufficient 
to offset both a reduction in external subsidy of £250 million 
and an unknown reductiofi'in the amount of cross-subsidy is pure 
conjecture. 
The evidence that the availability in terms of network coverage 
of local bus services will not be radically affected comes from 
the NBC/ITS study of cross-subsidy in Cheltenham [221. In fact, 
the interpretation placed on our evidence in the WP is quite 
false. It is stated (Para 12 of Appendix 8) that our Viable 
Network System minimised cross-subsidy, except to the extent that 
supporting unprofitable services was justified on wider 
commercial grounds. Compared with the base system, total 
patronage was higher, revenue support eliminated, and 
practically every residential area in Cheltenham remains within 
half a mile of a route. This is both ironic and wrong. It is 
ironic in that the VN5 was an attempt by an experienced NBC 
network designer to produce a network on MAP principles. It is, 
therefore, precisely the sort of network change which has already 
been introduced by NBC over the last decade, though rather more 
radical than the MAP scheme actually adopted in Cheltenham. 
Compared with the base, pre-MAP network, it does indeed reduce 
cross-subsidy substantially. But it does not eliminate it. One 
of the 9 routes in VNS has an operating ratio of only 0.32 and 
should be eliminated. In any case, the VNS may not be tenable 
under competition; several routes make sizeable surpluses, and 
all the remaining 8 make substantial inter-peak surpluses. 
We think, therefore, that the operator might well be forced to 
a smaller, core system. We tested 13 different networks, and 
found that, as one would expect, several performed similarly in 
financial terms. Taking a representative example BUILD 10, which 
is a 6 route network, we see that competiton may produce 
considerable changes in network coverage (see Fig. 1) .  
Table 10 
TEST Total Cost Total Rev. Net Poss 
per 4 weekly per 4 weeks Revenue Miles 
period (&) (£) £ (000) 
BASE (pre-MAP) 90500 78700 -11800 577.0 
Viable Network 67400 80000 12600 588.5 
System (23 buses; 
routes 1-9) 
BUILO 10 (14a 39500 65900 26400 486.1 
buses; routes 
1-6) 
VNS with fares 67400 66400 -1000 614.0 
down 20% 
BUILD 10 with 39500 41 500 2000 518.6 
faresdown 40% 
Table 10 shows the results of the relevant model tests. The test 
for the VNS with fares down 20L, in row 4 of the table, is 
representative of the sort of policy which might be followed by 
an operator concerned to maximise passenger mileage while 
breaking even. Competition is likely to force the operator 
towards a smaller network with lower fares, and a smaller volume 
of patronage, as represented in row 5 of the table. 
Finally, we would point out that Cheltenham was not one of our 
most heavily cross-subsidised areas. Hawick, Bridgend and 
Taunton all relied (relatively) more heavily on internal cross- 
subsidisation. In some of these areas, the availability of 
service might indeed be radically affected. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of the White Paper rests on four straightforward 
propositions; deregulation will produce a competitive market, 
competitive pressures will substantially reduce costs, 
competition will improve resource allocation, and will not cause 
significant adverse side effects. We reject all of these 
propositions. 
If there is any competition at all on bus routes, it will tend to 
be small group rather than large group. Active rivalry 
involving schedule matching and price wars may occur, as may 
collusion. Neither will produce efficient results except under 
extreme assumptions concerning contestability of markets, which 
we reject. 
But in any case, competition will not produce an efficient 
allocation of resourcesain this market. A first-best optimum 
Figure $l BUS Networks for Bare. VNS and various Policy Options. 
requires subsidies, and if these are constrained below optimal 
level by Government budget constraints, the second-best solution 
requires cross-subsidies. Competition is not consistent with 
either of these. Moreover, we can see no mechanism whereby 
competition optimises load factors to give a socially efficient 
balance between fares and service levels. We doubt whether the 
relative cost structures for buses and minibuses will permit 
successful entry by minibuses into dense markets except by 
operating at very high load factors, 'creaming' the best traffic. 
This may well be undesirable because of the resulting dilution of 
conventional bus frequencies and the congestion effects. 
It appears to us that the White Paper analysis seriously 
underplays the significance of these resource allocation 
arguments. In the end, the Government is making an act of faith 
that the benefits of the cost efficiency savings will dominate 
all the other undesirable effects. The evidence we have 
presented suggests the contrary. 
Finally, if improvements in cost efficiency are available, most 
of them could be captured by competitive tendering for bus 
routes. There is no reason why tendering should be confined to 
unprofitable routes; it could be extended to profitable ones as 
well. We accept that there are many difficulties with 
tendering, and that the problems of handling tenders in complex 
urban systems are severe. [251 But this solution does preserve 
the possibility of an efficiently planned public transport system 
- and competition is possible for the management function as well 
as for the operations [26]. Competition for the market would 
avoid many of the costs of on the road competition. As well as . 
making economic sense, these proposals have impeccable 
ideological credentials. [27,28] 
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Appendix 1 
Elasticities and the Effects of Competition 
This simple example uses a model of a route with the following 
demand and cost equations. 
Q = a exp [- b (v - + P)] 
m 
C = c M  
where 
Q = passenger miles demanded 
M = bus miles run 
P = price per passenger mile ( p )  
C = total cost (£) 
and a, b, v and c are parameters. 
Parameter values are as follows: 
Local 24,000 -0.0333 10980 .90 
Express 100,000 -0.3667 1113 .72 
The maximum mean bus load permitted for both local and express 
services is 40; obviously this is likely to imply higher load 
factors on the express service. 
At the following base positions, each operator is maximising 
passenger miles subject to earning 10% profits The base 
elasticities are as quoted in the text. The new position shows 
the minimum fare at which operators can break even given a 25% 
increase in bus miles run. 
Bus Miles Fare per Passenger Revenue Cost 
per day Passenger Miles (£) (£1 
Mile (p) Carried 
Local 
Bus (Base) 1170 9.0 13000 1170 1053 
Local 
Bus (New) 1560 10.5 13384 1405 1404 
Express 
Bus (Base) 690 3.0 18428 553 497 
Express 
Bus (New) 860 2.4 25803 619 619 
Appendix 2 
Optimal Subsidies - Some Results 
Let the demand for bus travel be given by: 
where G = generalised cost 
Q = volume. 
where P = price 
T, c waiting time for first bus 
T p  = expected additiona waiting time due to overloading 
M : bus miles run. 
where C c operating costs, which are taken to be proportionate 
to mileage but with an addition of c per passenger 
due to loading times. 2 
Thus we wish to maximise 
From I 
u2 
Since rn) is likely to rise with , or at least certainly i;i 
not fall, this implies a higher optimal price the higher the mean 
load factor on the bus. 
From I1 
From Ia 
IIa 
6T1 Since M > 0, Q > 0, c . 0 ,  this implies the existence of a 6M 
subsidy (due to the 'Mohring' effect). 
If we are now required to meet a binding budget constraint on a 
whole set of services, the maximisation problem becomes: 
Max if = i pi C i  (q) dq - H Qi L T ~ ~  + TZil - H cli Mi 
i o i i 
where S = subsidy 
From V 
VII 
gL;i Since X > 0 and <O, this implies a higher price than in the 
absence of a budget constraint. 
Other things being equal, price will still be higher on routes 
with higher load factors, but will be raised more where: 
- Demand is greater. 
- Demand is less responsive to generalised cost, in absolute 
terms (i.e. the slope of the demand curve is less steep). 
Obviously if the budget constraint is at, or near, breakeven, 
satisfying these constraints is likely to mean some routes 
operating at a profit and others at a loss. 
Tightening the constraint by requiring each route to break even 
individually will prevent this cross-subsidisation and worsen the 
overall outcome. 
As an example, consider two routes with the following demand 
curves (Nash, 1982, p. 57). 
Log Q1 = 4 - 0.04 PI - 0.3/M1 
Log Q 2  = 4 - 0.12 P2 - 0.5/M2 
The cost function is 
(for simplicity, we have ignored the effect of boarding times on 
costs). 
Thus the second route is more elastic, but with lower costs, 
perhaps indicating a more leisure oriented route than the first. 
Net social benefit is as follows: 
1 NSB = - 0.3 0.04 [ 4 - - 1  Q1 - -  MI l Q l  log Q1 - Q 1 l  0.04 
1 + - 0.5 [ 4 - - 1 0  - -  0.12 M2 [Q2 log Q2 - Q21 2 0.12 
The results of maximising this function subject firstly to an 
overall breakeven constraint and secondly subject to breakeven 
constraints on each route, are shown in Table 2 in the text. 
Appendix 3 
Competition on an Urban Bus Route : A Comment 
1. Introduction 
In the Buses White Paper, reference is made to a computer 
simulation model of competition on urban bus routes which, it is 
said, predicts that the results will be a mixture of big bus and 
minibus operation, giving "better results both financially and in 
terms of overall benefits to passengers than the conventional 
service" (Cmnd 9300, Annex 2, Para. 23). This model is discussed 
in an unpublished paper by Glaister (1984) : the aim of this note 
is to review the model and the results obtained. 
By way of introduction, it might be useful to the reader to 
summarise some of the results presented. The model is used to 
test three external changes - a reduction in subsidies to one- 
third of their current level; deregulation followed by an entry 
by minibuses, and a cost saving of nearly 40% accompanied by 
elimination of the remaining subsidy. These are tested on three 
traffic levels - high with a base level of service of 9.7 buses 
per hour in the suburbs rising to 58 in the city; medium, where 
the range is 6 to 36, and low where it is 2.8 to 17. Tables 1 
and 2 summarise the changes in fares and services in the suburbs 
and city respectively for the high and low flow cases. Thus at 
the suburban end of the route, the effect of the subsidy cut is a 
worsening both of fares and frequencies. Free entry with high 
flows further worsens the frequency of conventional buses, but 
offers the choice of a much more frequent service at more than 
three times the fare (more than four times the base fare) by 
minibus. It should be noted that since the high cost minibus 
operation also attracts subsidy of 1/9th of costs the absolute 
subsidy in this case is much higher than pre-deregulation - more 
than double, in fact. With low flows (2.8 per hour at the 
suburban terminal in the base), the effect of deregulation is 
more dramatic. Conventional buses cease operating, and a high 
frequency minibus takes over at well over 4 times the base fare. 
Even if the subsequently predicted competitive cost reduction is 
achieved, fares remain at very nearly four times their base 
level. These are startling conclusions, and very much at odds 
with the assertion in the preceding paragraph of the White Paper 
that on many services fares will fall. Nevertheless it is 
claimed that the gains to those who do gain outweigh the losses 
of those who lose even in this case (P. 15). 
2. The Model 
Any simulation model is bound to contain unrealistic assumptions 
and short cuts to make the problem manageable. Unfortunately, it 
is not always easy to tell whether these are seriously affecting 
the results. However,-.in this case, it is our view that the 
predictions themselves and the estimates of the resulting 
benefits to passengers are so inherently implausible that it is 
likely that some of the following list of shortcomings of the 
model are having a severe effect on its performance. 
Firstly, there is a serious problem facing any forecast of the 
outcome of free competition in the bus industry. This is that it 
is possible for the industry as a whole to break even, and for 
the marginal revenue of placing one extra bus on the road to 
equal the marginal cost, at a wide range of combinations of fares 
and output (see above, P .  17). Glaister overcomes this problem 
by a simple device. He pegs the load factor for each type of 
vehicle at a given level and sets the fare so as to break even at 
that load factor. This produces a unique equilibrium, but it is 
an arbitrary one. Moreover, it apparently affects the 
predictions in two ways: 
(a) the base position and the adjustments in fares and services 
consequent on a reduction in subsidy without deregulation 
are determined in an arbltrary fashion, rather than in 
accordance with optimising procedures. This appears to be 
very important. The assumed mean bus load of 40 is very 
high, so that in the base - even with high frequencies - so 
many buses are full that waiting times in the centre are 
very high. If the base position is unrealistically sub- 
optimal, this will naturally enhance the case for 
deregulation. 
It may be argued that, for the peak at least, 40 is not 
unreasonable. However, this brings in another problem. 
There is apparently no allowance in the costings for 'peak 
only' operations. These would inflate the costs of any 
type of operation, but presumably big buses can cope with 
the peak at a lower marginal cost than can small. 
Thus it seems likely that the fares both for big and 
minibuses are understated, unless he is assuming that peak 
extra services will cease to be provided. Certainly, the 
big bus fares are very low indeed. 
(b) following deregulation, there is no reason given in the 
paper why the market should not settle down with lower fares 
and higher load factors (lower frequencies) or vice versa, 
rather than those forecast. Indeed, the author himself 
suggests that minibus load factors may well be higher, 
permitting lower fares but giving longer waiting times. It 
should also be noted that no buses are permitted to turn 
short of the suburban terminus. This seems unlikely to be 
realised in practice, given the higher load factors to be 
obtained closer in to the city centre - it seems likely that 
the free competition combination of fares and frequencies at 
the suburban terminal would, ceteris paribus, be 
considerably poorer than suggested by this assumption. 
What of the conclusicrri'that passengers, by and large, would 
prefer a high frequency very high fare service to what they have 
at present? It seems that this conclusion also rests on these 
unrealistic assumptions. For instance, in the high flow case, 
after the cut in subsidy but before deregulation, it appears that 
in the suburbs - with 7.4 buses per hour - average waiting time 
is 4 minutes. Towards the centre, even with 44 buses per hour, 
this rises to a maximum of 13.8 minutes! What must be happening 
is that a large proportion of the big buses are running full, 
thus providing great potential for waiting time savings for large 
numbers of minibuses. But it seems most unlikely that these 
waiting times on high frequency routes are typica in practice : 
faced withsuch problems, most operators would supplement the 
service over the busier part of the route. 
Some of the waiting times for low frequency routes appear to be 
unreasonably long as well. For instance, with 2.6 buses per hour 
in the suburbs, the typical waiting time is 10.8 minutes. This 
clearly presumes a random arrival of passengers : at such low 
frequencies, many passengers would in fact know the timetable and 
arrive accordingly. 
3. Conclusions 
Enough has been said in this note to suggest that the model 
presented in the paper in question is so unrealistic that its 
predictions should not be taken seriously. Thus it cannot be 
regarded as evidence for or against the policies advocated in the 
White Paper. But if we did believe that its predictions would 
come true, we should regard the prospects of large numbers of 
minibuses displacing conventions1 buses and operating at 3-4 
times the current fares as very alarming evidence in favour of 
the retention of bus regulation. 
Table  1 - Suburbs 
P o l i cy  
High Flow 
F a r e s  and S e r v i c e s  
Base 9.7 buse s  a t  3.7p 
2/3 c u t  i n  subs idy  7.4 " " 4 . 9 ~  
Entry o f  Minibuses 5.6 " " 4 . 9 ~  
and 20 minibuses  a t  1 6 . 6 ~  
Cost and subs idy  r educ t i on  - 4.4 " " 3 . 4 ~  
and 28 minibuses  a t  1 2 . 1 ~  
Low Flow 
Base 
2/3 c u t  i n  subs idy  
Entry  o f  Minibuses 
Cost and subs idy  r educ t i on  
2.8 buses  a t  4.5p 
2.6 " " 6 . 0 ~  
14 minibuses  a t  23p 
21 minibuses  a t  1 7 . 6 ~  
Table  2 - Ci ty  
P o l i cy  F a r e s  and S e r v i c e s  
High Flow 
Base 58 buses  a t  3.7p 
2/3 c u t  i n  subs idy  44 " " 4 . 9 ~  
Ent ry  o f  Minibuses 34 " " 4 . 9 ~  
and 121 minibuses  a t  1 6 . 6 ~  
Cost and subs idy  r educ t i on  26 " " 3 . 4 ~  
and 170 minibuses  a t  1 2 . 1 ~  
Low Flow 
Base 
2/3 c u t  i n  subs idy  
Entry o f  Minibuses 
Cost and subs idy  r educ t i on  
17 buses  a t  4.5p 
15 " " 6 . 0 ~  
84 minibuses  a t  23p 
128 minibuses  a t  1 7 . 6 ~  
Note: A l l  f a r e s  a r e  expressed  i n  p pe r  passenger  mile. 
-
Appendix 4 
Walters on Externalities in Urban Buses: A Comment 
Walters (1982) produces some very surprising results on optimal 
bus size. He concludes (under given assumptions) that the 
greater the volume of traffic, the smaller the optimal bus. He 
argues that typical urban buses in developed countries are far 
too large, and also that as a result of taking into account the 
bus size decision, the economies of scale noted by Mohring (1972) 
whereby increases in traffic volumes lead to some combination of 
reduced bus operating costs and reduced waiting times, are 
probably trivially small. 
All of these conclusions appear to follow from a simple error in 
Walters' model. He introduces variables for the flow of 
passengers (p), the size of bus (A) and the waiting time for a 
standard bus (v) without noticing that - given optimal behaviour 
- v is uniquely determined by p. Let k be the capacity of a 
standard bus. The standard bus will only be chosen when, given 
optimal frequency, it offers just the right capacity. 
Thus, frequency (f) will be related to the size of bus by the 
P formula f = - (or this plus a margin of spare capacity to Ak 
allow for stochastic variations in p). It follows that the 
waiting time for a standard bus (v) is given by half the headway, 
kA or - . Substituting this into the expression for total costs 
2P 
where: 
WP Apkw c(A) = -+ -k A ZP 
C(A) -wp kuw and - - 
- kA 2 +2 
+ other costs 
= 0 for minimum costs 
where w is the wage rate. 
This gives the result: 
If we assume, as Walters does, that = 0.5, we may further 
simplify this to: 
Thus optimal bus size does rise with p, although less than 
proportionately. 
So far we have assumed that wages costs are constant regardless 
of the size of bus. Following Walters, we may allow for rising 
costs with bus size as follows: 
.-. . 
- wap wbp + @& 
- kA +k WP 
+ other costs 
+ other costs 
Minimising this gives: 
Assuming = 0.5, this gives 
Bus size still rises with p, although with a < 1, the optimal bus 
size is reduced for all values of p. 
With Walters assumption of a = 0.33, what values of Ak does this 
imply? For a flow of 900, the optimal bus load is around 35, 
implying that - with a margin for stochastic variations in demand 
- the optimal size bus is something like a standard U.S. single 
decker. With flows of 581 and 129 (the other examples quoted by 
Walters), optimal bus loads are 28 and 13 respectively. Thus for 
the latter flow only, a bus significantly smaller than the 
standard bus would be appropriate. However, given that this is 
an off-peak flow, it may well still be better to use the larger 
buses required for the peak to cover it. 
In British conditions, it seems unlikely that the difference 
between large and small bus costs would be as great as Walters 
postulates for the U.S. The figures quoted in Glaister (1984) 
suggest that small (15 seater) bus costs are around £1.2957 per 
mile and 88 seaters are £2.1297 per mile (assuming speeds of 7.74 
mph and 6.88 mph respectively). This would imply values of a = 
0.53 and b = 0.47. Thus the optimal size buses and frequencies 
would be as follows: 
Volume per Bus load Frequency Total operating and 
hour 
- waiting costs 
900 44 21 31.2 W 
(Numbers do not correspond exactly due to rounding.) 
Thus the 15 seater minibus only comes into its own at flows of 50 
per hour or less. Even this conclusion is uncertain, since at 
these volumes, conventional bus frequencies would be too low for 
passengers to arrive at random, so that waiting times are 
overstated in the model..-..Again, it should be noted that dealing 
with peaks in demand by expanding frequencies is very much more 
expensive than allowed for in this model, so that much higher 
optimal loads are likely to rule in the peak, leading to the use 
of larger buses all day. 
A further important result should be noted. Substituting back 
forX in the equation for total cost gives: 
In other words, the portion of total cost that varies with volune 
has a cost elasticity of 0.5. That economies of scale are highly 
significant is also seen from the above table. 
Thus we conclude that: 
- Larger traffic flows generally justify larger buses. 
- Only on routes with very low traffic flows is there a case 
for using smaller buses than standard. 
- Even when variable bus size is allowed for, there remains a 
good case for subsidising urban bus routes due to the 
"Mohring" economies of scale effect. 
C.A. NASH 
